But what then am I, this inexhaustible, unfathomable historical self? Or, upon what ground may one commit empiricism?
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 178 (1):143 - 154 (2011)
This essay examines the perspective from which Bas van Fraassen, in his book, The Empirical Stance, explains the project of empiricism. I argue that this perspective is a robustly transcendental perspective, which suggests that the tradition of empiricism lacks the resources to explain itself. I offer an alternative history of epistemic voluntarism in twentieth-century philosophy to the history van Fraassen himself provides, one that finds the novelty in van Fraassen's own views to be precisely his reintroduction of the knowing mind into the tradition of analytic philosophy of science
|Keywords||Bas van Fraassen Empiricism Epistemic voluntarism Transcendental philosophy|
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Nelson Goodman (1951). The Structure of Appearance. Harvard University Press.
Imre Lakatos (1971). History of Science and its Rational Reconstructions. In R. C. Buck & R. S. Cohen (eds.), PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. D. Reidel. 91-108.
Karl R. Popper (1972). Objective Knowledge. Oxford,Clarendon Press.
Alan Richardson (2006). Freedom in a Scientific Society: Reading the Context of Reichenbach's Contexts. In Jutta Schickore & Friedrich Steinle (eds.), Revisiting Discovery and Justification. Springer. 41--54.
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