Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 41 (3):187-209 (2000)
|Abstract||Frege famously held that there is a close connection between our concept of cardinal number and the notion of one-one correspondence, a connection enshrined in Hume's principle. Husserl, and later Parsons, objected that there is no such close connection that our most primitive conception of cardinality arises from our grasp of the practice of counting. I argue, however, that Frege was close to right, that our concept of cardinal number is closely connected with a notion like that of one-one correspondence, a more primitive notion we might call just as many.|
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