Disappearance and the identity theory

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (September):473-85 (1981)
We have no schema for comprehending how a radical revision of our conceptual scheme such as that embraced by "eliminative materialism" could possibly be rationally justified. This general point is illustrated and pressed through an examination of richard rorty's classic defense of the "disappearance form of the identity theory." it is argued that 1) though more standard critiques of rorty fail, 2) rorty fails to make out the case for the view that incorrigibility" is the "mark of the mental" to the exclusion of intentionality, And 3) the paradigmatic elimination of demons a explanatory entities cannot be extended to yield a justification for the elimination of the mental
Keywords Epistemology  Identity Theory  Materialism  Rorty, R
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.1981.10716316
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