Existential Epistemology: A Heideggerian Critique of the Cartesian Project

Oxford University Press (1986)
Abstract
A lucid introduction to the "existential phenomenology" of Martin Heidegger, particularly as developed in his major work, Being and Time, this work focuses on how Heidegger's ideas bear on the central problem in epistemology--that of how we can have objective knowledge. The author constructs fresh arguments clarifying Heidegger's contribution to the theory of knowledge, and shows why Heidegger deemed misguided the search for knowledge of the way things are in themselves.
Keywords Knowledge, Theory of History  Existential phenomenology History
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Call number B3279.H49.R49 1986
ISBN(s) 0198249063   019823922X  
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Kris McDaniel (2013). Heidegger's Metaphysics of Material Beings. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):332-357.
Leslie Stevenson (1993). Heidegger on Cartesian Scepticism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 1 (1):81 – 98.
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