|Abstract||Recent debates about memetics have revealed some widespread misunderstandings about Darwinian approaches to cultural evolution. Drawing from these debates, this paper disputes five common claims: (1) mental representations are rarely discrete, and therefore models that assume discrete, gene-like particles (i.e., replicators) are useless, (2) replicators are necessary for cumulative, adaptive evolution, (3) contentdependent psychological biases are the only important processes that affect the spread of cultural representations, (4) the “cultural fitness” of a mental representation can be inferred from its successful transmission, and (5) selective forces only matter if the sources of variation are random. We close by sketching the outlines of a unified evolutionary science of culture.|
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|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
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