|Abstract||Group beneficial norms are common in human societies. The persistence of such norms is consistent with evolutionary game theory, but existing models do not provide a plausible explanation for why they are common. We show that when a model of imitation used to derive replicator dynamics in isolated populations is generalized to allow for population structure, group beneficial norms can spread rapidly under plausible conditions. We also show that this mechanism allows recombination of different group beneficial norms arising in different populations.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Peter Suber (1989). The Reflexivity of Change: The Case of Language Norms. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 3 (2):100 - 129.
Joseph M. Grcic (1985). Democratic Capitalism: Developing a Conscience for the Corporation. Journal of Business Ethics 4 (2):145 - 150.
David Henderson (2005). Norms, Invariance, and Explanatory Relevance. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (3):324-338.
C. Bicchieri (2010). Norms, Preferences, and Conditional Behavior. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 9 (3):297-313.
Lisa J. Carlson & Raymond Dacey (forthcoming). Social Norms and the Traditional Deterrence Game. Synthese.
Peter Godfrey-Smith (2008). Varieties of Population Structure and the Levels of Selection. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (1):25-50.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads4 ( #178,517 of 549,014 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,261 of 549,014 )
How can I increase my downloads?