How Not to Russell Carnap's Aufbau

PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:3 - 14 (1990)
Abstract On the standard interpretation Rudolf Carnap's Der logische Aufbau der Welt amounts to a highly derivative work-a rigorous thinking through of Russell's External World program. An examination of the aims and methods of logical analysis reveals significant differences between the epistemologies of Russell and Carnap, however. It is argued that Russell's reliance on acquaintance makes logical analysis subservient to empiricist epistemic concerns while Carnap is determined to carry out a broadly Kantian program of guaranteeing the objectivity of science through the application of formal logic.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified (fix it)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 5,653
External links
  • Through your library Configure

    Similar books and articles
    Christopher Pincock (2005). A Reserved Reading of Carnap's Aufbau. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):518–543.
    Richard Creath (1982). Was Carnap a Complete Verificationist in the Aufbau? PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:384 - 393.
    Thomas Mormann (2006). Description, Construction and Representation. From Russell and Carnap to Stone. In Guido Imagire & Christine Schneider (eds.), Untersuchungen zur Ontologie.

    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2011-05-29

    Total downloads

    8 ( #122,951 of 548,984 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #63,327 of 548,984 )

    How can I increase my downloads?


    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.

    Other forums