How Not to Russell Carnap's Aufbau

Abstract
On the standard interpretation Rudolf Carnap's Der logische Aufbau der Welt amounts to a highly derivative work-a rigorous thinking through of Russell's External World program. An examination of the aims and methods of logical analysis reveals significant differences between the epistemologies of Russell and Carnap, however. It is argued that Russell's reliance on acquaintance makes logical analysis subservient to empiricist epistemic concerns while Carnap is determined to carry out a broadly Kantian program of guaranteeing the objectivity of science through the application of formal logic.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,337
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Christopher Pincock (2005). A Reserved Reading of Carnap's Aufbau. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):518–543.
Richard Creath (1982). Was Carnap a Complete Verificationist in the Aufbau? PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:384 - 393.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-05-29

Total downloads

14 ( #109,791 of 1,096,603 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #51,759 of 1,096,603 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.