David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Perspectives on Science 10 (1):1-27 (2002)
: According to Kuhn, theory choice is not governed by algorithms, but by values, which influence yet do not determine theory choice. Cladistic hypotheses, however, seem to be evaluated relative to a parsimony algorithm, which asserts that the best phylogenetic hypothesis is the one that requires the fewest character changes. While this seems to be an unequivocal evaluative rule, it is not. The application of the parsimony principle is ultimately indeterminate because the choice and individuation of characters that figure in parsimony computations are indeterminate. The cladistic approach is Kuhnian because the application of parsimony depends on persuasion, background, training and tradition
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Elliott Sober (1996). Parsimony and Predictive Equivalence. Erkenntnis 44 (2):167 - 197.
Fabrizzio Guerrero Mc Manus (2009). Rational Disagreements in Phylogenetics. Acta Biotheoretica.
Daniel Nolan (1997). Quantitative Parsimony. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):329-343.
Craig DeLancey (2011). Does a Parsimony Principle Entail a Simple World? Metaphysica 12 (2):87-100.
Michael Huemer (2009). When is Parsimony a Virtue? Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):216-236.
Plutynski Anya (2005). Parsimony and the Fisher–Wright Debate. Biology and Philosophy 20 (4):697-713.
Elliott Sober (2002). Reconstructing the Character States of Ancestors: A Likelihood Perspective on Cladistic Parsimony. The Monist 85 (1):156 - 176.
Richard Richards (2003). Character Individuation in Phylogenetic Inference. Philosophy of Science 70 (2):264-279.
Nico M. Franz (2005). Outline of an Explanatory Account of Cladistic Practice. Biology and Philosophy 20 (2-3):489-515.
Elliott Sober (1987). Parsimony, Likelihood, and the Principle of the Common Cause. Philosophy of Science 54 (3):465-469.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads24 ( #59,752 of 1,005,468 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,743 of 1,005,468 )
How can I increase my downloads?