Moral Reasoning as Perception: A Reading of Carol Gilligan

Hypatia 11 (3):97-113 (1996)
Gilligan's understanding of moral reasoning as a kind of perception has its roots in the conception of moral experience espoused by Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch. A clear understanding of that conception, however, reveals grave difficulties with Gilligan's descriptions of the care perspective and justice perspective. In particular, we can see that the two perspectives are not mutually exclusive once we recognize that attention does not require attachment and that impartiality does not require detachment
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DOI 10.1111/j.1527-2001.1996.tb01017.x
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F. H. Bradley (1951). Ethical Studies. New York, Liberal Arts Press.

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