On the consistency of second-order contextual definitions

Noûs 26 (4):491-494 (1992)
Abstract
One of the earliest discussions of the so-called 'bad company' objection to Neo-Fregeanism, I show that the consistency of an arbitrary second-order 'contextual definition' (nowadays known as an 'abstraction principle' is recursively undecidable. I go on to suggest that an acceptable such principle should satisfy a condition nowadays known as 'stablity'.
Keywords Frege  Bad Company
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DOI 10.2307/2216025
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Øystein Linnebo (2009). Introduction. Synthese 170 (3):321-329.
Patricia Blanchette (2016). The Breadth of the Paradox. Philosophia Mathematica 24 (1):30-49.

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