Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them

New York: Cambridge University Press (1990)
Abstract
This book makes a stimulating contribution to the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. It begins with a spirited defense of the view that propositions are structured and that propositional structure is "psychologically real." The author then develops a subtle view of propositions and attitude ascription. The view is worked out in detail with attention to such topics as the semantics of conversations, iterated attitude ascriptions, and the role of propositions as bearers of truth. Along the way important issues in the philosophy of mind are addressed.
Keywords Ascription  Language  Mind  Propositional Attitudes  Semantics  Thought  Truth
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Call number BC181.R5 1990
ISBN(s) 0521381266
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Peter Hanks (2009). Recent Work on Propositions. Philosophy Compass 4 (3):469-486.
Jeffrey C. King (2013). On Fineness of Grain. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):763-781.

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