Plantinga, God, and (yet) other minds

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):40 – 54 (1972)
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Abstract

In this paper I argue for the following three claims. (1) the teleological argument is much weaker than plantinga allows, And, Indeed, As plantinga formulates it, It does not seem even to support a theistic position. (2) the argument from evil is much stronger than plantinga maintains, And, In any case, His attempt to show that it is without logical force is unsuccessful. (3) the analogical argument for other minds is indeed not strong, But it is not the best argument we have. (edited)

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The Argument from Evil: ROBERT J. RICHMAN.Robert J. Richman - 1969 - Religious Studies 4 (2):203-211.

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