Responsible agents and the “truth” about their future states

Philosophical Psychology 10 (4):507 – 516 (1997)
Abstract
In the posthumously published Behind the eye , the late D.M. MacKay gave the definitive statement of his position on determinism and responsibility. This position relies heavily on two basic insights: first, a prediction of a human being's future states is not accurate if the subject of the prediction believes it; second, a proposition is true only if some agent's ability to exert control depends upon the accuracy of the proposition. In this essay, I develop an argument for the incompatibility of determinism and responsibility, as well as a counter argument which takes advantage of the preceding two insights. Next, I clarify MacKay's conception of truth and apply it to these arguments. Lastly, I defend MacKay's position against three possible criticisms.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,374
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.

Added to index

2010-05-07

Total downloads

0

Recent downloads (6 months)

0

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.