David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (4):392 – 403 (1984)
This paper looks at a dispute decision theory about how best to characterize expected utility maximization and express the logic of rational choice. Where A1, … , An are actions open to some particular agent, and S1, … , Sn are mutually exclusive states of the world such that the agent knows at least one of which obtains, does the logic of rational choice require an agent to consider the conditional probability of choice Ai given that some state Si obtains, Prob(Ai/Si). Or, is the logic of choice better represented by considering the probability of the counterfactual if Ai then Si, Prob(Ai ⟥-> Si). Causal decision theory, developed by Allan Gibbard, William Harper, and David Lewis defend the counterfactual analysis; whereas, Richard Jeffrey and others defend the conditional probability analysis, evidential decision theory. I argue that the problems posed by cases of decision instability favor evidential decision theory.
|Keywords||decision theory causal decision theory evidential decision theory rational choice expected utility Newcomb's Paradox decision instability Death in Aleppo|
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Citations of this work BETA
Frank Arntzenius (2008). No Regrets, Or: Edith Piaf Revamps Decision Theory. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 68 (2):277-297.
Paul Weirich (1985). Decision Instability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (4):465 – 472.
Frederick Kroon (1993). Rationality and Epistemic Paradox. Synthese 94 (3):377 - 408.
Brian Skyrms (1986). Deliberational Equilibria. Topoi 5 (1):59-67.
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