David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Ethics 10 (4):419 - 462 (2006)
Martha Nussbaum has powerfully argued in Frontiers ofJustice and elsewhere that John Rawls’s sort of social-contract theory cannot usefully be deployed to deal with issues pertaining to justice for the disabled. To counter this claim, this article deploys Rawls’s sort of social-contract theory in order to deal with issues pertaining to justice for the disabled—or, since, as Nussbaum stresses, we all have some degree of disability—for the severely disabled. In this way, rather than questioning one by one Nussbaum’s interpretive claims about Rawls’s view, one can simply see how the Rawlsian framework can work in application to this issue. Following Rawls’s lead, the paper utilizes the idealized “initial choice situation” as an analytic and comparative device for examining alternative principles of justice, developing three different interpretations of the initial choice situation that each correspond to a different set of principles that apply to people of all levels of disability. One of these sets of principles is a simple extension of Rawls’s, one is very close to what Nussbaum herself recommends, and the third is a kind of hybrid. In this way, it is shown not only that Rawls’s social-contract device can usefully be applied to these issues, but also that it is helpful for exploring the deep commitments underlying each of these competing sets of principles.
|Keywords||Disability justice Martha Nussbaum John Rawls reciprocity social contract veil of ignorance|
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Citations of this work BETA
Christie Hartley (2011). Disability and Justice. Philosophy Compass 6 (2):120-132.
Sophia Isako Wong (2009). Duties of Justice to Citizens with Cognitive Disabilities. Metaphilosophy 40 (3-4):382-401.
Gabriele Badano (2014). Political Liberalism and the Justice Claims of the Disabled: A Reconciliation. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 17 (4):1-22.
Henry S. Richardson (2011). Interpreting Rawls: An Essay on Audard, Freeman, and Pogge. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 15 (3):227-251.
John Vorhaus (2015). Dignity, Capability, and Profound Disability. Metaphilosophy 46 (3):462-478.
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