Online research in philosophy

The phenomenon known as sour grapes appears to wreak havoc on subjectivist accounts of the personal good. There have been many attempts to solve the problem of sour grapes, many of which include rejecting subjectivism altogether. I argue in this paper that the problem of sour grapes can be overcome by a recognizably subjectivist account of well-being, a view I call welfare coherentism. In addition, I argue, the solution must be subjectivist; standard attempts to solve the problem of sour grapes (...) fail because they are unable to correctly identify the underlying problem that sour grapes exposes. (shrink)

Sour Grapes aims to subvert orthodox theories of rational choice through the study of forms of irrationality. Dr Elster begins with an analysis of the notation of rationality, to provide the background and terms for the subsequent discussions, which cover irrational behaviour, irrational desires and irrational belief. These essays continue and complement the arguments of Jon Elster's earlier book, Ulysses and the Sirens. That was published to wide acclaim, and Dr Elster shows the same versatility here in drawing on philosophy, (...) political and social theory, decision-theory, economics and psychology, as well as history and literature. (shrink)

An adaptive preference is a preference that is regimented in response to an agent’s set of feasible options. The fabled fox in the sour grapes story undergoes an adaptive preference change. I consider adaptive preferences more broadly, to include adaptive preference formation as well. I argue that many adaptive preferences that other philosophers have cast out as irrational sour-grapes-like preferences are actually fully rational preferences worthy of pursuit. I offer a means of distinguishing rational and worthy adaptive preferences from irrational (...) and unworthy ones. The distinction is based on the agent’s own appraisal of the adaptive preference. (shrink)