David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
This thesis examines some of the contested meanings of what it is to be a self, person and individual. The law of obligations sets the context for this examination. One of the important aspects of contemporary feminist philosophy has been its move beyond highlighting inconsistencies in political and legal theory, in which theoretical frameworks can be shown to rely upon an ambiguous treatment of women. The feminist theorists whose work is considered use these theoretical weaknesses as a point of departure to propose different conceptual frameworks. I start by analysing contemporary work on the self from within both philosophy of science and feminist metaphysics to draw out common approaches from these diverse positions. These themes are then discussed in the context of the law. I then critically examine the concept of legal personhood in the work of Drucilla Cornell and her proposals for the amendment of tort law. This is juxtaposed with an analysis of the practical operation of tort law by adapting François Ewald's work on risk and insurance to English law. I concentrate on women's ambiguous position with regard to both risk and to the image of the individual that is the subject of Ewald's critique. This is followed by an examination of the changing position of women with regard to 'possessive individualism', 'self-ownership' or 'property in the person' in relation to contract law and social contract theory. There are a number of different social contracts discussed in the thesis: Cornell's reworking of John Rawls and the stories of Thomas Hobbes and of Carole Pateman. The final 'social contract' to be discussed is that of 'new contractualism', the employment of contract as a technique of government. I argue that Pateman's critique of possessive individualism continues to be relevant at a time when the breadwinner/housewife model has broken down
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Janice Richardson (2009). The Classic Social Contractarians: Critical Perspectives From Contemporary Feminist Philosophy and Law. Ashgate Pub. Company.
Ben Golder, Rethinking the Subject of Postmodern Feminist Legal Theory: Towards a Feminist Foucaultian Jurisprudence.
Janice Richardson (2011). The Changing Meaning of Privacy, Identity and Contemporary Feminist Philosophy. Minds and Machines 21 (4):517-532.
Brian Bix (2010). Contracts. In Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer (eds.), The Ethics of Consent: Theory and Practice. Oxford University Press
Herta Nagl-Docekal (2004). Feminist Philosophy. Westview Press.
Sue V. Rosser (1987). Feminist Scholarship in the Sciences: Where Are We Now and When Can We Expect A Theoretical Breakthrough? Hypatia 2 (3):5 - 17.
Sally Sheldon & Michael Thomson (eds.) (1998). Feminist Perspectives on Health Care Law. Cavendish Pub..
L. Ryan Musgrave (2003). Liberal Feminism, From Law to Art: The Impact of Feminist Jurisprudence on Feminist Aesthetics. Hypatia 18 (4):214-235.
Jane Duran (1998). Philosophies of Science/Feminist Theories. Westview Press.
Drucilla Cornell (1991). Beyond Accommodation: Ethical Feminism, Deconstruction, and the Law. Routledge.
Elena Loizidou (2007). Judith Butler: Ethics, Law, Politics. Routledge-Cavendish.
Marion Smiley (2004). Democratic Citizenship V. Patriarchy: A Feminist Perspective on Rawls. Fordham Law Review (5):1599-1627.
Neil MacCormick (2007). Institutions of Law: An Essay in Legal Theory. Oxford University Press.
Jules L. Coleman (1992). Risks and Wrongs. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2012-11-01
Total downloads28 ( #148,049 of 1,934,666 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #195,964 of 1,934,666 )
How can I increase my downloads?