David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophia Mathematica 8 (2):124-149 (2000)
Syntactic Reductionism, as understood here, is the view that the ‘logical forms’ of sentences in which reference to abstract objects appears to be made are misleading so that, on analysis, we can see that no expressions which even purport to refer to abstract objects are present in such sentences. After exploring the motivation for such a view, and arguing that no previous argument against it succeeds, sentences involving generalized quantifiers, such as ‘most’, are examined. It is then argued, on this basis, that Syntactic Reductionism is untenable.
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G. A. Antonelli (2010). Notions of Invariance for Abstraction Principles. Philosophia Mathematica 18 (3):276-292.
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Katherine Hawley (2007). Neo‐Fregeanism and Quantifier Variance. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):233 - 249.
Chris Daly & Simon Langford (2011). Two Anti-Platonist Strategies. Mind 119 (476):1107-1116.
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