David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Biology and Philosophy 25 (5):823-841 (2010)
This paper describes, analyzes, and critiques the construction of separate male and female genomes in current human genome research. Comparative genomic work on human sex differences conceives of the sexes as like different species, with different genomes. I argue that this construct is empirically unsound, distortive to research, and ethically questionable. I propose a conceptual model of biological sex that clarifies the distinction between species and sexes as genetic classes. The dynamic interdependence of the sexes makes them dyadic kinds that are not like species, which are individual kinds. The concept of sex as a dyadic kind may be fruitful as a remedy to the tendency to conceive of the sexes as distinct, binary classes in biological research on sex more generally
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References found in this work BETA
John Dupré (1993). The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science. Harvard University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Angela Potochnik (2012). Feminist Implications of Model-Based Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (2):383-389.
Moira Howes (2012). Managing Salience: The Importance of Intellectual Virtue in Analyses of Biased Scientific Reasoning. Hypatia 27 (4):736-754.
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