David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):66-86 (2011)
According to the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, it is more difficult to justify doing harm than it is to justify allowing harm. Enabling harm consists in withdrawing an obstacle that would, if left in place, prevent a pre-existing causal sequence from leading to foreseen harm. There has been a lively debate concerning the moral status of enabling harm. According to some (e.g. McMahan, Vihvelin and Tomkow), many cases of enabling harm are morally indistinguishable from doing harm. Others (e.g. Foot, Hanser) support the Equivalence Hypothesis, according to which enabling harm is morally equivalent to allowing harm. Here I argue that there is every reason to embrace, and no reason to reject, the Equivalence Hypothesis
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References found in this work BETA
Jonathan Francis Bennett (1995). The Act Itself. Oxford University Press.
Christopher Boorse & Roy A. Sorensen (1988). Ducking Harm. Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):115-134.
Philippa Foot (1967). The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect. Oxford Review 5:5-15.
Matthew Hanser (1999). Killing, Letting Die and Preventing People From Being Saved. Utilitas 11 (03):277-.
Shelly Kagan (1989). The Limits of Morality. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Christian Barry (2012). Local Priorities, Universal Priorities, and Enabling Harm. Ethics and International Affairs 26 (1):21-26.
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