The Sense of Communication

Mind 104 (413):79 - 106 (1995)
Abstract
Many philosophers nowadays believe Frege was right about belief, but wrong about language: The contents of beliefs need to be individuated more finely than in terms of Russellian propositions, but the contents of utterances do not. I argue that this 'hybrid view' cannot offer no reasonable account of how communication transfers knowledge from one speaker to another and that, to do so, we must insist that understanding depends upon more than just getting the references of terms right.
Keywords Frege  Sense
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    Citations of this work BETA
    Michael Nelson (2008). Frege and the Paradox of Analysis. Philosophical Studies 137 (2):159 - 181.
    Imogen Dickie (2011). How Proper Names Refer. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):43-78.
    Jonas Åkerman (2010). Communication and Indexical Reference. Philosophical Studies 149 (3):355 - 366.

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