Agent-neutral Consequentialism from the Inside-out: Concern for Integrity without Self-indulgence

Utilitas 13 (02):236- (2001)
Abstract
Is there a justification of concern for one's own integrity that agent-neutral consequentialism cannot explain? In addressing this question, it is important to be clear about what is meant by 'agent-neutral', 'consequentialism', and 'integrity'. Let 'consequentialism' be constituted by the following two theses
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Greg Scherkoske (2012). Could Integrity Be An Epistemic Virtue? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (2):185-215.
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