David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 131 (2):487 - 510 (2006)
What is it for a speech-act to be sincere? A very tempting answer, defended by John Searle and others, is that a speech-act is sincere just in case the speaker has the state of mind it expresses. I argue that we should instead hold that a speech-act is sincere just in case the speaker believes that she has the state of mind she believes it expresses (Sections 1 and 2). Scenarios in which speakers are deluded about their own states of mind play an important role in arguing for this account. In the course of developing this account I also explore how it might make good use of the often neglected distinction between insincerity and mere non-sincerity (Section 2). After defending and developing my positive proposal, I explore its implications for debates over expressivism in meta-ethics (Sections 3 and 4).
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Philosophy of Mind Philosophy of Religion|
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References found in this work BETA
Allan Gibbard (2003). Thinking How to Live. Harvard University Press.
John R. Searle (1969). Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge University Press.
Simon Blackburn (1984). Spreading the Word. Clarendon Press.
Wayne A. Davis (2002). Meaning, Expression, and Thought. Cambridge University Press.
Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (1998). A Problem for Expressivism. Analysis 58 (4):239–251.
Citations of this work BETA
Eric Schwitzgebel (2010). Acting Contrary to Our Professed Beliefs or the Gulf Between Occurrent Judgment and Dispositional Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):531-553.
Caj Strandberg (2011). The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation. Journal of Ethics 15 (4):341-369.
Mike Ridge (2013). Disagreement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):41-63.
John Eriksson (2014). Elaborating Expressivism: Moral Judgments, Desires and Motivation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):253-267.
Neil Sinclair (2009). Recent Work in Expressivism. Analysis 69 (1):136-147.
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