David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 131 (2):487 - 510 (2006)
What is it for a speech-act to be sincere? A very tempting answer, defended by John Searle and others, is that a speech-act is sincere just in case the speaker has the state of mind it expresses. I argue that we should instead hold that a speech-act is sincere just in case the speaker believes that she has the state of mind she believes it expresses (Sections 1 and 2). Scenarios in which speakers are deluded about their own states of mind play an important role in arguing for this account. In the course of developing this account I also explore how it might make good use of the often neglected distinction between insincerity and mere non-sincerity (Section 2). After defending and developing my positive proposal, I explore its implications for debates over expressivism in meta-ethics (Sections 3 and 4).
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Philosophy of Mind Philosophy of Religion|
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References found in this work BETA
John R. Searle (1969). Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge University Press.
Allan Gibbard (2003). Thinking How to Live. Harvard University Press.
Simon Blackburn (1984). Spreading the Word. Clarendon Press.
Wayne A. Davis (2002). Meaning, Expression, and Thought. Cambridge University Press.
Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (1998). A Problem for Expressivism. Analysis 58 (4):239–251.
Citations of this work BETA
Eric Schwitzgebel (2010). Acting Contrary to Our Professed Beliefs or the Gulf Between Occurrent Judgment and Dispositional Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):531-553.
Caj Strandberg (2011). The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation. Journal of Ethics 15 (4):341-369.
Mike Ridge (2013). Disagreement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):41-63.
John Eriksson (2014). Elaborating Expressivism: Moral Judgments, Desires and Motivation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):253-267.
Neil Sinclair (2009). Recent Work in Expressivism. Analysis 69 (1):136-147.
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F. N. J. Hibberd (1985). Must an Educator Be Sincere? Journal of Moral Education 14 (3):162-169.
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