Free will and contextualism

Philosophical Studies 129 (2):223 - 252 (2006)
Abstract
This paper proposes a contextualist solution to the puzzle about free will. It argues that the context-sensitivity of statements about freedom of the will follows from the correct analysis of these statements. Because the analysis is independently plausible, the contextualism is warranted not merely in virtue of its capacity to solve the puzzle.
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    References found in this work BETA
    Stewart Cohen (1988). How to Be a Fallibilist. Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.
    Keith DeRose (1995). Solving the Skeptical Problem. Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.

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