McDowell and Dreyfus on Unreflective Action

Inquiry 53 (2):183-207 (2010)
Within philosophy there is not yet an integrative account of unreflective skillful action. As a starting point, contributions would be required from philosophers from both the analytic and continental traditions. Starting from the McDowell-Dreyfus debate, shared Aristotelian-Wittgensteinian common ground is identified. McDowell and Dreyfus agree about the importance of embodied skills, situation-specific discernment and responsiveness to relevant affordances. This sheds light on the embodied and situated nature of adequate unreflective action and provides a starting point for the development of an account that does justice to insights from both philosophical traditions
Keywords Embodied Cognition  Relevant Affordances  Skillful Unreflective Action  Dreyfus  Wittgenstein  McDowell  Aristotle
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00201741003612203
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,667
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Aristotle (2012). Nicomachean Ethics. Courier Dover Publications.
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

View all 27 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Donnchadh O'Conaill (2013). On Being Motivated. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):579-595.
Donnchadh O.’Conaill (2014). The Space of Motivations. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (3):440-455.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

245 ( #5,506 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #231,316 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.