David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Acta Biotheoretica (1-2):33-49 (2009)
Species are generally considered to be the basic units of evolution, and hence to constitute spatio-temporally bounded entities. In addition, it has been argued that species also instantiate a natural kind. Evolution is fundamentally about change. The question then is how species can remain the same through evolutionary change. Proponents of the species qua individuals thesis individuate species through their unique evolutionary origin. Individuals, or spatio-temporally located particulars in general, can be bodies, objects, events, or processes, or a combination of these. It is here argued that species are best understood as open or closed, causally integrated processual systems that also instantiate an historically conditioned homeostatic property cluster natural kind.
|Keywords||Philosophy Evolutionary Biology Philosophy of Biology|
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Miles MacLeod & Thomas A. C. Reydon (2013). Natural Kinds in Philosophy and in the Life Sciences: Scholastic Twilight or New Dawn? [REVIEW] Biological Theory 7 (2):89-99.
Olivier Rieppel (2010). The Series, the Network, and the Tree: Changing Metaphors of Order in Nature. Biology and Philosophy 25 (4):475-496.
Olivier Rieppel (2010). New Essentialism in Biology. Philosophy of Science 77 (5):662-673.
Olivier Rieppel (2013). Biological Individuals and Natural Kinds. Biological Theory 7 (2):162-169.
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