David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Theory & Psychology 18 (3):341-361 (2008)
For Merleau-Ponty,consciousness in skillful coping is a matter of prereflective ‘I can’ and not explicit ‘I think that.’ The body unifies many domain-specific capacities. There exists a direct link between the perceived possibilities for action in the situation (‘affordances’) and the organism’s capacities. From Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions it is clear that in a flow of skillful actions, the leading ‘I can’ may change from moment to moment without explicit deliberation. How these transitions occur, however, is less clear. Given that Merleau-Ponty suggested that a better understanding of the self-organization of brain and behavior is important, I will re-read his descriptions of skillful coping in the light of recent ideas on neurodynamics. Affective processes play a crucial role in evaluating the motivational significance of objects and contribute to the individual’s prereflective responsiveness to relevant affordances.
|Keywords||Affordances Cognitive neuroscience Emotions Expertise Merleau-Ponty Non-linear dynamic systems theory Performance monitoring Context switching Self-organization Relevance|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Joel Krueger (2011). Extended Cognition and the Space of Social Interaction. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):643-657.
Pim Klaassen, Erik Rietveld & Julien Topal (2010). Inviting Complementary Perspectives on Situated Normativity in Everyday Life. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):53-73.
Julian Kiverstein (2012). The Meaning of Embodiment. Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (4):740-758.
Timothy Mooney (2011). Plasticity, Motor Intentionality and Concrete Movement in Merleau-Ponty. Continental Philosophy Review 44 (4):359-381.
Similar books and articles
Erik Rietveld (2010). McDowell and Dreyfus on Unreflective Action. Inquiry 53 (2):183-207.
David Morris (1999). The Fold and the Body Schema in Merleau-Ponty and Dynamic Systems Theory. Chiasmi International 1:275-286.
David Morris (2008). Body. In Rosalyn Diprose & Jack Reynolds (eds.), Merleau-ponty: Key Concepts. Acumen Publishing 111-120.
Nebojsa Kujundzic & William Buschert (1994). Instruments and the Body: Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Research in Phenomenology 24 (1):206-215.
Hubert L. Dreyfus (2002). Intelligence Without Representation – Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Mental Representation the Relevance of Phenomenology to Scientific Explanation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (4):367-383.
Douglas Low (2004). The Continuing Relevance of The Structure of Behavior. International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (3):411-430.
Douglas Low (1992). Merleau-Ponty on Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity. International Studies in Philosophy 24 (3):45-64.
Stephen Priest (1998). Merleau-Ponty. Routledge.
Ralph D. Ellis (2006). Phenomenology-Friendly Neuroscience: The Return to Merleau-Ponty as Psychologist. Human Studies 29 (1):33 - 55.
Added to index2010-01-30
Total downloads113 ( #20,116 of 1,725,161 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #349,161 of 1,725,161 )
How can I increase my downloads?