Graduate studies at Western
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (1):75-86 (1991)
|Abstract||In this paper, criticisms are made of the main tenets of Professor Mellor's argument against ‘backwards’ causation. He requires a closed causal chain of events if there is to be ‘backwards’ causation, but this condition is a metaphysical assumption which he cannot totally substantiate. Other objections to Mellor's argument concern his probabilistic analysis of causation, and the use to which he puts this analysis. In particular, his use of conditional probability inequality to establish the ‘direction’ of causation is shown to be in error. 1I am indebted to Drs H. Krips, L. O'Neill and to the anonymous referee for their suggestions and critical comments on earlier drafts.|
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