David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Studies 107 (1):87--108 (2002)
Current epistemological dogma has it that the twin goalsof believing truths and avoiding errors exhaust our cognitive aspirations.On such a view, (call it the TG view) the only evaluationsthat count as genuinely epistemological are those that evaluatesomething (a belief, believer, set of beliefs, a cognitivetrait or process, etc.) in terms of its connection to thesetwo goods. In particular, this view implies that all theepistemic value of knowledge must be derived from thevalue of the two goals cited in TG. I argue thatthis implication is false, and thus that the TG view must be abandoned. I propose a candidate to replacethe TG view that makes better sense of the value ofknowledge.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Wayne Riggs (2007). Why Epistemologists Are so Down on Their Luck. Synthese 158 (3):329 - 344.
Similar books and articles
Corine Besson (2010). Propositions, Dispositions and Logical Knolwedge. In M. Bonelli & A. Longo (eds.), Quid Est Veritas? Essays in Honour of Jonathan Barnes. Bibliopolis.
Gordon Prescott Barnes (2007). Necessity and Apriority. Philosophical Studies 132 (3):495 - 523.
Benjamin McMyler (2012). Responsibility for Testimonial Belief. Erkenntnis 76 (3):337-352.
Roberto Casati & Achille Varzi (2000). True and False: An Exchange. In André Chapuis & Anil Gupta (eds.), Circularity, Definition, and Truth. Sole Distributor, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers. 365--370.
Barry C. Smith (1998). On Knowing One's Own Language. In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. 391--428.
Daniel Whiting (2013). Nothing but the Truth: On the Norms and Aims of Belief. In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press.
Neil Feit & Andrew Cullison (2011). When Does Falsehood Preclude Knowledge? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):283-304.
Murat Bac & Nurbay Irmak (2011). Knowing Wrongly: An Obvious Oxymoron, or a Threat for the Alleged Universality of Epistemological Analyses? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):305-321.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads28 ( #60,830 of 1,098,412 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #113,260 of 1,098,412 )
How can I increase my downloads?