David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Acta Analytica 23 (1):1-8 (2008)
It is generally assumed that there are (at least) two fundamental epistemic goals: believing truths, and avoiding the acceptance of falsehoods. As has been often noted, these goals are in conflict with one another. Moreover, the norms governing rational belief that we should derive from these two goals depend on how we weight them relative to one another. However, it is not obvious that there is one objectively correct weighting for everyone in all circumstances. Indeed, as I shall argue, it looks as though there are circumstances in which a range of possible weightings of the two goals are all equally epistemically rational.
|Keywords||Justification Epistemology Risk Relativism Theory of knowledge|
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References found in this work BETA
Wayne D. Riggs (2003). Balancing Our Epistemic Goals. Noûs 37 (2):342–352.
William James (1969). The Moral Philosophy of William James. New York, Crowell.
Citations of this work BETA
Allan Hazlett (2013). Entitlement and Mutually Recognized Reasonable Disagreement. Episteme (1):1-25.
Jason Kawall (2013). Friendship and Epistemic Norms. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):349-370.
Karyn L. Freedman (2015). Testimony and Epistemic Risk: The Dependence Account. Social Epistemology 29 (3):251-269.
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