Epistemic risk and relativism

Acta Analytica 23 (1):1-8 (2008)
It is generally assumed that there are (at least) two fundamental epistemic goals: believing truths, and avoiding the acceptance of falsehoods. As has been often noted, these goals are in conflict with one another. Moreover, the norms governing rational belief that we should derive from these two goals depend on how we weight them relative to one another. However, it is not obvious that there is one objectively correct weighting for everyone in all circumstances. Indeed, as I shall argue, it looks as though there are circumstances in which a range of possible weightings of the two goals are all equally epistemically rational.
Keywords Justification  Epistemology  Risk  Relativism  Theory of knowledge
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-008-0020-6
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Jason Kawall (2013). Friendship and Epistemic Norms. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):349-370.

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