David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Metaphilosophy 41 (1):172-188 (2010)
Abstract: Open-mindedness is typically at the top of any list of the intellectual or "epistemic" virtues. Yet, providing an account that simultaneously explains why open-mindedness is an epistemically valuable trait to have and how such a trait is compatible with full-blooded belief turns out to be a challenge. Building on the work of William Hare and Jonathan Adler, I defend a view of open-mindedness that meets this challenge. On this view, open-mindedness is primarily an attitude toward oneself as a believer, rather than toward any particular belief. To be open-minded is to be aware of one's fallibility as a believer, and to acknowledge the possibility that anytime one believes something, one could be wrong. In order to see that such an attitude is epistemically valuable even to an already virtuous agent, some details of the skills and habits of the open-minded agent are elucidated.
|Keywords||virtue virtue epistemology intellectual virtue epistemology open‐mindedness|
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References found in this work BETA
Linda Zagzebski (1996). Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry Into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
Miranda Fricker (2007). Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford University Press.
Ernest Sosa (2007/2009). A Virtue Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
James Montmarquet (1993). Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility. Rowman & Littlefield.
Robert Campbell Roberts (2007). Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Maura Priest (forthcoming). Inferior Disagreement. Acta Analytica:1-21.
Valerie Tiberius & Jason Swartwood (2011). Wisdom Revisited: A Case Study in Normative Theorizing. Philosophical Explorations 14 (3):277-295.
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