Reliability and the value of knowledge

Reliabilism has come under recent attack for its alleged inability to account for the value we typically ascribe to knowledge. It is charged that a reliably-produced true belief has no more value than does the true belief alone. I reply to these charges on behalf of reliabilism; not because I think reliabilism is the correct theory of knowledge, but rather because being reliably-produced does add value of a sort to true beliefs. The added value stems from the fact that a reliably-held belief is non-accidental in a particular way. While it is widely acknowledged that accidentally true beliefs cannot count as knowledge, it is rarely questioned why this should be so. An answer to this question emerges from the discussion of the value of reliability; an answer that holds interesting implications for the value and nature of knowledge.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00143.x
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Linda Zagzebski (2008). The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good. In Duncan Pritchard & Ram Neta (eds.), Metaphilosophy. Routledge 55.

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