David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):79-96 (2002)
Reliabilism has come under recent attack for its alleged inability to account for the value we typically ascribe to knowledge. It is charged that a reliably-produced true belief has no more value than does the true belief alone. I reply to these charges on behalf of reliabilism; not because I think reliabilism is the correct theory of knowledge, but rather because being reliably-produced does add value of a sort to true beliefs. The added value stems from the fact that a reliably-held belief is non-accidental in a particular way. While it is widely acknowledged that accidentally true beliefs cannot count as knowledge, it is rarely questioned why this should be so. An answer to this question emerges from the discussion of the value of reliability; an answer that holds interesting implications for the value and nature of knowledge
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B. J. C. Madison (2011). Combating Anti Anti-Luck Epistemology. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):47-58.
Jason S. Baehr (2006). Character in Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 128 (3):479--514.
Jennifer Lackey (2007). Why We Don't Deserve Credit for Everything We Know. Synthese 158 (3):345--361.
Jennifer Lackey (2009). Knowledge and Credit. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):27 - 42.
Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (2012). What's so Good About a Wise and Knowledgeable Public? Acta Analytica 27 (2):199-216.
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