Two Problems of Easy Credit

Synthese 169 (1):201 - 216 (2009)
This paper defends the theory that knowledge is credit-worthy true belief against a family of objections, two instances of which were leveled against it in a recent paper by Jennifer Lackey. Lackey argues that both innate knowledge (if there is any) and testimonial knowledge are too easily come by for it to be plausible that the knower deserves credit for it. If this is correct, then knowledge would appear not to be a matter of credit for true belief. I will attempt to neutralize these objections by drawing a distinction between credit as praiseworthiness and credit as attributability.
Keywords Knowledge  Credit  Epistemology  Testimony
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DOI 10.2307/40271297
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Jennifer Lackey (2009). Knowledge and Credit. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):27 - 42.
Kristoffer Ahlstrom‐Vij (2015). The Social Virtue Of Blind Deference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3).

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