David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 158 (3):329 - 344 (2007)
It is nearly universally acknowledged among epistemologists that a belief, even if true, cannot count as knowledge if it is somehow largely a matter of luck that the person so arrived at the truth. A striking feature of this literature, however, is that while many epistemologists are busy arguing about which particular technical condition most effectively rules out the offensive presence of luck in true believing, almost no one is asking why it matters so much that knowledge be immune from luck in the first place. I argue that the best explanation for the consensus that luck undermines knowledge is that knowledge is, complications aside, credit-worthy true believing. To make this case, I develop both the notions of luck and credit, and sketch a theory of knowledge in those terms. Furthermore, this account also holds promise for being able to solve the “value problem” for knowledge, and it explains why both internal and external conditions are necessary to turn true belief into knowledge.
|Keywords||Epistemology Knowledge Luck Credit|
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References found in this work BETA
J. Adler (2002). Belief's Own Ethics. MIT Press.
Pamela Hieronymi (2006). Controlling Attitudes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74.
Ward E. Jones (1997). Why Do We Value Knowledge? American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (4):423 - 439.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2003). The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Cambridge University Press.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1998). ``Why Should Inquiring Minds Want to Know?&Quot. The Monist 81 (3):426--451.
Citations of this work BETA
J. Adam Carter (2013). A Problem for Pritchard's Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology. Erkenntnis 78 (2):253-275.
Duncan Pritchard (2007). Anti-Luck Epistemology. Synthese 158 (3):277 - 297.
Nathan Ballantyne (2012). Luck and Interests. Synthese 185 (3):319-334.
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2010). Luck as an Epistemic Notion. Synthese 176 (3):361-377.
E. J. Coffman (2009). Does Luck Exclude Control? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):499-504.
Similar books and articles
Duncan Pritchard (2008). Knowledge, Luck and Lotteries. In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan.
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Nenad Miščević (2007). Armchair Luck: Apriority, Intellection and Epistemic Luck. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 22 (1):48-73.
Ernest Sosa (2010). Value Matters in Epistemology. Journal of Philosophy 107 (4):167-190.
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Daniel Breyer (2010). Reflective Luck and Belief Ownership. Acta Analytica 25 (2):133-154.
B. J. C. Madison (2011). Combating Anti Anti-Luck Epistemology. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):47-58.
Jennifer Lackey (2007). Why We Don't Deserve Credit for Everything We Know. Synthese 158 (3):345--361.
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