David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Neuroethics 3 (1):5-12 (2010)
I will argue that the fairly common assumption that brain imaging may compromise people’s privacy in an undesirable way only if moral crimes are committed is false. Sometimes persons’ privacy is compromised because of failures of privacy. A normal emotional reaction to failures of privacy is embarrassment and shame, not moral resentment like in the cases of violations of right to privacy. I will claim that if (1) neuroimaging will provide all kinds of information about persons’ inner life and not only information that is intentionally searched for, and (2) there will be more and more application fields of fMRI and more and more people whose brains will be scanned (without any coercion), then, in the future, shame may be an unfortunately common feeling in our culture. This is because failures of privacy may dramatically increase. A person may feel shame strongly and long, especially if his failure is witnessed by people who he considers relatively important, but less than perfectly trustworthy.
|Keywords||Privacy Brain imaging Shame|
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References found in this work BETA
William James (1890). The Principles of Psychology. Dover Publications.
Immanuel Kant (2006). Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View. Cambridge University Press.
Neil Levy (2007). Neuroethics: Challenges for the 21st Century. Cambridge University Press.
Bernard Williams (1992). Shame and Necessity. University of California Press.
Judy Illes & Eric Racine (2005). Imaging or Imagining? A Neuroethics Challenge Informed by Genetics. American Journal of Bioethics 5 (2):5 – 18.
Citations of this work BETA
Steve Clarke (2013). The Neuroscience of Decision Making and Our Standards for Assessing Competence to Consent. Neuroethics 6 (1):189-196.
D. A. Baker, N. J. Schweitzer & Evan F. Risko (2014). Perceived Access to Self-Relevant Information Mediates Judgments of Privacy Violations in Neuromonitoring and Other Monitoring Technologies. Neuroethics 7 (1):43-50.
Soraj Hongladarom (2015). Brain-Brain Integration in 2035: Metaphysical and Ethical Implications. Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society 13 (3/4):205-217.
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