Philosophia 39 (2):345-355 (2011)
|Abstract||In this paper, I respond to Pierre Le Morvan’s critique of my thesis that ignorance is lack of true belief rather than absence of knowledge. I argue that the distinction between dispositional and non-dispositional accounts of belief, as I made it in a previous paper, is correct as it stands. Also, I criticize the viability and the importance of Le Morvan’s distinction between propositional and factive ignorance. Finally, I provide two arguments in favor of the thesis that ignorance is lack of true belief rather than absence of knowledge|
|Keywords||Latent belief, dispositional belief, propositional ignorance factive ignorance, true belief, knowledge excuse|
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