Abstract

According to Derek Parfit's well‐known argument, a version of utilitarian moral theory implies the so‐called Repugnant Conclusion. This version of utilitarianism states that other things being equal, it is better if there is a greater total sum of whatever makes life worth living. This view appears to implicate that a world where there is an immense total sum of whatever makes life worth living but where individual people have an exceedingly low quality of life is better than a world where there are considerably less people and a smaller total sum of whatever makes life worth living but where individual people have a high quality of life. Parfit finds the conclusion hard to accept. However, a Swedish philosopher Torbjörn Tännsjö has recently replied to Parfit, arguing that, in fact, the Repugnant Conclusion is perfectly acceptable. Tännsjö's reply, in turn, has been criticized by another Swede, Gustaf Arrhenius. In my paper I evaluate both Tännsjö's reply and Arrhenius' criticism and find both of them insufficient.