The limits of representationalism: A phenomenological critique of Thomas Metzinger's self-model theory
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthesis Philosophica 2 (40):355-371 (2005)
Thomas Metzinger’s self-model theory offers a frame¬work for naturalizing subjective experiences, e.g. first-person perspective. These phenomena are explained by referring to representational contents which are said to be interrelated at diverse levels of consciousness and correlated with brain activities. The paper begins with a consideration on naturalism and anti-naturalism in order to roughly sketch the background of Metzinger’s claim that his theory renders philosophical speculations on the mind unnecessary . In particular, Husserl’s phenomenological conception of consciousness is refuted as uncritical and inadequate. It will be demonstrated that this critique is misguided. . The main deficiencies of Metzinger’s theory will be elucidated by referring to the conception of phenomenal transparency which will be compared to a phenomenological idea of transparency . Then we shall enlarge our critical horizon by focusing on some implications of representationalism, including reification of consciousness, brain-Cartesianism, and exclusion of the social dimension . Finally, we shall take up our meta-theoretical reflections on the naturalism debate.
|Keywords||Metaphysics Model Phenomenology Representationalism Self Metzinger, Thomas|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Thomas Metzinger (ed.) (1995). Metzinger, Thomas (1995). Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.
Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (2004). Representationalism and Beyond: A Phenomenological Critique of Thomas Metzinger's Self-Model Theory. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (10-11):88-108.
Josh Weisberg (2003). Being All That We Can Be: A Critical Review of Thomas Metzinger's Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (11):89-96.
Uriah Kriegel (2009). Self-Representationalism and Phenomenology. Philosophical Studies 143 (3):357-381.
Dorothée Legrand (2005). Transparently Oneself: Commentary on Metzinger's Being No-One. Psyche 11 (5).
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads115 ( #32,113 of 1,793,065 )
Recent downloads (6 months)10 ( #79,554 of 1,793,065 )
How can I increase my downloads?