Conservatively extending classical logic with transparent truth

Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (2):354-378 (2012)
This paper shows how to conservatively extend classical logic with a transparent truth predicate, in the face of the paradoxes that arise as a consequence. All classical inferences are preserved, and indeed extended to the full (truth—involving) vocabulary. However, not all classical metainferences are preserved; in particular, the resulting logical system is nontmnslllve. Some limits on this nontransitivity are adumbrated, and two proof systems are presented and shown to be sound and complete. (One proof system allows for Cut—elimination, but the other does not.)
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive David Ripley, Conservatively extending classical logic with transparent truth
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Szymon Frankowski (2004). Formalization of a Plausible Inference. Bulletin of the Section of Logic 33 (1):41--52.
Michael Kremer (1988). Kripke and the Logic of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (3):225 - 278.

View all 10 references

Citations of this work BETA
David Ripley (2013). Paradoxes and Failures of Cut. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):139 - 164.
Elia Zardini (2013). Naive Modus Ponens. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (4):575-593.
David Ripley (2013). Response to Heck. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):n/a-n/a.
Lionel Shapiro (2013). Validity Curry Strengthened. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):100-107.

View all 6 citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

61 ( #38,840 of 1,699,640 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

18 ( #39,449 of 1,699,640 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.