Conservatively extending classical logic with transparent truth

Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (2):354-378 (2012)
Abstract
This paper shows how to conservatively extend classical logic with a transparent truth predicate, in the face of the paradoxes that arise as a consequence. All classical inferences are preserved, and indeed extended to the full (truth—involving) vocabulary. However, not all classical metainferences are preserved; in particular, the resulting logical system is nontmnslllve. Some limits on this nontransitivity are adumbrated, and two proof systems are presented and shown to be sound and complete. (One proof system allows for Cut—elimination, but the other does not.)
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References found in this work BETA
Szymon Frankowski (2004). Formalization of a Plausible Inference. Bulletin of the Section of Logic 33 (1):41--52.
Michael Kremer (1988). Kripke and the Logic of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (3):225 - 278.

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Citations of this work BETA
David Ripley (2013). Paradoxes and Failures of Cut. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):139 - 164.
Elia Zardini (2013). Naive Modus Ponens. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (4):575-593.
Lionel Shapiro (2013). Validity Curry Strengthened. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):100-107.
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