David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (2):1-21 (2011)
I make the observation that English sentences such as “You have reason to take the bus or to take the train” do not have the logical form that they superficially appear to have. I find in these sentences a conjunctive use of “or,” as found in sentences like “You can have milk or lemon in your tea,” which gives you a permission to have milk, and a permission to have lemon, though no permission to have both. I argue that a confusion of genuine disjunctions with sentences of the above form has motivated the mistaken acceptance by some philosophers of principles like the one I call “Liberal Transmission.” This is the principle that if you have a reason to do something, then you have a reason to do it in each of the possible ways in which it can be done (though not more than one of them). I argue that Liberal Transmission and its close relatives are false. Wide-scope reasons are defined as reasons that have a conditional or other logical connective within the scope of the reason operator. For example, a wide-scope instrumental reason might be: reason(if you have an end, take the means). By refuting Liberal Transmission, I show that you could have wide-scope instrumental reasons like this while nevertheless lacking any narrow-scope reason to take the means, or narrow-scope reason to not have the end. This enables me to respond to two major objections to the wide-scope approach to the instrumental principle that have been developed by Joseph Raz and by Niko Kolodny.
|Keywords||instrumental principle wide-scope reasons rationality rational requirements normative recommendings|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Alex Worsnip (2015). Narrow-Scoping for Wide-Scopers. Synthese 192 (8):2617-2646.
Jeffrey Seidman (forthcoming). The Unity of Caring and the Rationality of Emotion. Philosophical Studies:1-17.
Similar books and articles
Jonathan Way (2010). Defending the Wide-Scope Approach to Instrumental Reason. Philosophical Studies 147 (2):213 - 233.
John Brunero (2012). Instrumental Rationality, Symmetry and Scope. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):125-140.
Jonathan Way (2012). Explaining the Instrumental Principle. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):487-506.
Markos Valaris (2012). Instrumental Rationality. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):443-462.
John Broome (2007). Wide or Narrow Scope? Mind 116 (462):359-370.
John Brunero (2010). The Scope of Rational Requirements. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):28-49.
Niko Kolodny (2007). State or Process Requirements? Mind 116 (462):371-385.
Andrew Reisner (2009). Unifying the Requirements of Rationality. Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):243-260.
Jonathan Way (2011). The Symmetry of Rational Requirements. Philosophical Studies 155 (2):227-239.
Niko Kolodny (2005). Why Be Rational? Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Mark Schroeder (forthcoming). Hypothetical Imperatives: Scope and Jurisdiction. In Robert Johnson & Mark Timmons (eds.), (unknown). Oxford
Mark Schroeder (2004). The Scope of Instrumental Reason. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):337–364.
Errol Lord (2011). Violating Requirements, Exiting From Requirements, and the Scope of Rationality. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):392-399.
Sam Shpall (2013). Wide and Narrow Scope. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):717-736.
Added to index2011-02-15
Total downloads69 ( #58,455 of 1,789,933 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #264,810 of 1,789,933 )
How can I increase my downloads?