Causal compatibilism -- what chance?

Erkenntnis 63 (1):119-132 (2005)
Abstract
Orthodox physicalism has a problem with mental causation. If physics is complete and mental events are not identical to physical events (as multiple-realisation arguments imply) it seems as though there is no causal work for the mental to do. This paper examines some recent attempts to overcome this problem by analysing causation in terms of counterfactuals or conditional probabilities. It is argued that these solutions cannot simultaneously capture the force of the completeness of physics and make room for mental causation
Keywords Causation  Compatibilism  Counterfactual  Mental  Metaphysics  Physicalism  Probability
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-005-3056-7
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References found in this work BETA
Stephen Yablo (1992). Mental Causation. Philosophical Review 101 (2):245-280.
David Lewis (1973). Causation. Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.
David Lewis (2000). Causation as Influence. Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):182-197.

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