Critical Thinking is Epistemically Responsible

Metaphilosophy 43 (5):659-678 (2012)
Michael Huemer () argues that following the epistemic strategy of Critical Thinking—that is, thinking things through for oneself—leaves the agent epistemically either worse off or no better off than an alternative strategy of Credulity—that is, trusting the authorities. Therefore, Critical Thinking is not epistemically responsible. This article argues that Reasonable Credulity entails Critical Thinking, and since Reasonable Credulity is epistemically responsible, the Critical Thinking that it entails is epistemically responsible too
Keywords social epistemology  epistemic responsibility  appeal to authority  critical thinking  applied epistemology  informal logic
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2012.01773.x
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References found in this work BETA
James Pryor (2001). Highlights of Recent Epistemology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1):95--124.

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