Critical Thinking is Epistemically Responsible

Metaphilosophy 43 (5):659-678 (2012)
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Abstract

Michael Huemer () argues that following the epistemic strategy of Critical Thinking—that is, thinking things through for oneself—leaves the agent epistemically either worse off or no better off than an alternative strategy of Credulity—that is, trusting the authorities. Therefore, Critical Thinking is not epistemically responsible. This article argues that Reasonable Credulity entails Critical Thinking, and since Reasonable Credulity is epistemically responsible, the Critical Thinking that it entails is epistemically responsible too

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Juho Ritola
University of Turku

Citations of this work

Twisted thinking: Technology, values and critical thinking.Lavinia Marin & Steinert Steffen - 2022 - Prometheus. Critical Studies in Innovation 38 (1):124-140.
Critical Thinking and Epistemic Responsibility Revisited.Surajit Barua - 2021 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 38 (3):285-299.

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