David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Acta Biotheoretica 30 (1):49-66 (1981)
The unity of organisms can be viewed in terms of the concepts of enkapsis and complementarity. A model (or a type) represents those properties (of elements, structure, and system) which renders cases - the organisms under consideration — comparable. Comparability is established by operations (or metamorphoses) which relate a case to a model. Therefore, the model and the operations must be enumerated together, if a certain morphology is to be established and applied. Two models, which in some way are related, are conjunct, otherwise they are disjunct. If one model is deducible from the other, they are enkaptic conjunct. If the models are essentially different, that is to say that they cannot be transduced into each other, although they condition each other, they are complementary conjunct: although not comparable themselves, only both together describe a case (or a set of cases) completely. Now, the comparability of a case with two models is considered. The two basic patterns of general comparability are homology and analogy. If the two models are complementary conjunct, nine patterns of special comparability can be distinguished. Each is named in accordance with the general meaning of homology and analogy and, as far as possible, with conventional scientific usage. With minor modifications the terminology also applies to more complicated patterns of comparability including distinct or different conjunct models.
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