Graduate studies at Western
Noûs 39 (3):483 - 504 (2005)
|Abstract||An electron clearly has the property of having a charge of þ1.6 Â 10À19 coulombs, but does it also have the property of being charged ? Philosophers have worried whether so-called ‘determinable’ predicates, such as ‘is charged’, actually refer to determinable properties in the way they are happy to say that determinate predicates, such as ‘has a charge of þ1.6 Â 10À19 coulombs’, refer to determinate properties. The distinction between determinates and determinables is itself fairly new, dating only to its definition by the Cambridge logician W. E. Johnson early in the last century.1 But despite its newly minted condition the distinction has found little currency in on-going philosophical debates. Or at least until recently.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Robert Schroer (2011). Can Determinable Properties Earn Their Keep? Synthese 183 (2):229-247.
Carl Gillett & Bradley Rives (2005). The Nonexistence of Determinables: Or, a World of Absolute Determinates as Default Hypothesis. Noûs 39 (3):483–504.
Roberto Poli (2004). W. E. Johnson's Determinable-Determinate Opposition and His Theory of Abstraction. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 82 (1):163-196.
David H. Sanford, Determinates Vs. Determinables. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Arthur N. Prior (1949). Determinables, Determinates and Determinants. Mind 58 (229):1-20.
Anthony B. Dardis (2002). A No Causal Rivalry Solution to the Problem of Mental Causation. Acta Analytica 17 (28):69-77.
Arthur N. Prior (1949). Determinables, Determinates and Determinants (II). Mind 58 (230):178-194.
Jessica M. Wilson (2012). Fundamental Determinables. Philosophers' Imprint 12 (4).
David A. Denby (2001). Determinable Nominalism. Philosophical Studies 102 (3):297--327.
Sara Worley (1997). Determination and Mental Causation. Erkenntnis 46 (3):281-304.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads15 ( #85,965 of 723,130 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,087 of 723,130 )
How can I increase my downloads?