Abstract

This third volume of the Minnesota series differs from the first two in its greater emphasis on the methodology of the physical sciences. Most of the interest of these earlier volumes was directed to an analysis of the concepts of psychology, psycho-analysis, and the philosophy of mind. The concept of scientific explanation is here analyzed in successive papers by Feyerabend, Hempel, Scriven, and Brodbeck; and the problem of the status of theoretical entities in science is treated by Maxwell and Rozeboom. The volume closes with two lengthy articles on problems surrounding the concepts of space and time. The first, by A. Grünbaum, makes a thorough attempt to resolve the problem of conventionalism in physical science; and the other, a detailed analysis by W. Sellars, examines the concepts of existence, becoming, event, and truth in their relationships to the concept of time. This important addition to the Minnesota series confirms the impression of the earlier volumes, that, although the contributors differ in details, they share the common goal of formulating, with the tools of modern logical and linguistic analysis, a reasonable empiricist interpretation of modern science which will avoid the dogmas and crudities of the empiricisms as well as the rationalisms of the past.--R. H. K.