Functionalism and thinking animals

Philosophical Studies 147 (3):347 - 354 (2010)
Abstract
Lockean accounts of personal identity face a problem of too many thinkers arising from their denial that we are identical to our animals and the assumption that our animals can think. Sydney Shoemaker has responded to this problem by arguing that it is a consequence of functionalism that only things with psychological persistence conditions can have mental properties, and thus that animals cannot think. I discuss Shoemaker’s argument and demonstrate two ways in which it fails. Functionalism does not rid the Lockean of the problem of too many thinkers.
Keywords Personal identity  The problem of too many thinkers  Functionalism  Lockeanism  Sydney Shoemaker
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    References found in this work BETA
    Eric T. Olson (2002). Personal Identity. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
    Sydney Shoemaker (1980). Causality and Properties. In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause. D. Reidel. 109-35.

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