On for someone's sake attitudes

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):397-411 (2009)
Abstract
Personal value, i.e., what is valuable for us, has recently been analysed in terms of so-called for-someone’s- sake attitudes. This paper is an attempt to add flesh to the bone of these attitudes that have not yet been properly analysed in the philosophical literature. By employing a distinction between justifiers and identifiers, which corresponds to two roles a property may play in the intentional content of an attitude, two different kinds of for-someone’s- sake attitudes can be identified. Moreover, it is argued that one of these kinds is particularly difficult to include in an analysis of value simpliciter but not in an analysis of value for
Keywords Personal value  Intentional content  Fitting attitude  Buck-passing  Love  Admiration  Sake  Universalizability  Good for
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 21,476
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Connie S. Rosati (2008). Objectivism and Relational Good. Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):314-349.
Michael J. Zimmerman (2009). Understanding What's Good for Us. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):429 - 439.

View all 11 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-05-18

Total downloads

53 ( #82,944 of 1,911,757 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #144,933 of 1,911,757 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.