Bioconservatism, Bioliberalism, and Repugnance
Monash Bioethics Review (forthcoming)
| Abstract | We consider the current debate between bioconservatives and their opponents—whom we dub bioliberals—about the moral acceptability of human enhancement and the policy implications of moral debates about enhancement. We argue that this debate has reached an impasse, largely because bioconservatives hold that we should honour intuitions about the special value of being human, even if we cannot identify reasons to ground those intuitions. We argue that although intuitions are often a reliable guide to belief and action, there are circumstances in which they are not reliable. Intuitions—including intuitions about enhancement—are subject to various cognitive biases rendering them unreliable in some circumstances. We argue that many bioconservative intuitions about enhancement are examples of such unreliable intuitions. Given this, it is unrealistic of bioconservatives to expect others to rely on their unexamined intuitions. Furthermore, refusing to engage in debates about the reasons and values that underpin their intuitions about enhancement will have the effect of making bioconservative voices less relevant in policy debates about enhancement than they would otherwise be. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Enhancement Bias Heuristics Intuition Bioconservatives | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
  |
| External links |
 Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesJohn Harris (2011). Moral Enhancement and Freedom. Bioethics 25 (2):102-111.
S. Matthew Liao (2008). A Defense of Intuitions. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):247 - 262.
Elijah Chudnoff (forthcoming). The Rational Roles of Intuition. In Anthony Booth & Darrell Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions. Oxford University Press.
Richard Twine (2007). Thinking Across Species—a Critical Bioethics Approach to Enhancement. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 28 (6):509-523.
Brian Weatherson (2003). What Good Are Counterexamples? Philosophical Studies 115 (1):1-31.
Thomas Douglas (2008). Moral Enhancement. Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (3):228-245.
Nick Bostrom (2005). In Defense of Posthuman Dignity. Bioethics 19 (3):202–214.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-05-27Total downloads52 ( #19,947 of 549,070 )Recent downloads (6 months)15 ( #4,153 of 549,070 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
