Mellor and Dennett on the perception of temporal order

Philosophical Quarterly 50 (195):231-238 (1999)
Abstract
I discuss theories about the way in which we determine the precedence ofperceived events. I examine Mellor’s account, which claims that it is thetiming of our perceptions of events that enables us to determine their order,and Dennett’s criticism of this. Dennett cites psychological experimentswhich suggest that it is the content of our perceptions, rather than theirtiming, which allows us to determine the order of the events perceived. Iargue that by distinguishing between two different ways of construing‘perception’ we can see not only that the two accounts are compatible, but that Dennett’s account presupposes Mellor’s
Keywords Epistemology  Perception  Reality  Time  Dennett, D  Mellor, D H
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References found in this work BETA
D. H. Mellor (1981). Real Time. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Adrian Bardon (2011). Kant and the Conventionality of Simultaneity. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (5):845-856.
Charles Spence & Cesare Parise (2010). Prior-Entry: A Review. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (1):364-379.
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