A Vindication of Strong Aesthetic Supervenience

Philosophical Papers 34 (2):149-171 (2005)
Abstract Disagreement persists concerning whether aesthetic properties supervene on non-aesthetic properties. This issue is complicated by the fact that the notion of an aesthetic property is itself contentious. In this paper, I begin by identifying three conditions that arguably characterize a large number of aesthetic properties. After defending aesthetic supervenience against a number of objections, I argue that a strong version of the supervenience thesis applies to those properties that satisfy my initial conditions
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/05568640509485153
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,667
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Robert Wicks (1988). Supervenience and Aesthetic Judgment. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 46 (4):509-511.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
D. H. Hick (2012). Aesthetic Supervenience Revisited. British Journal of Aesthetics 52 (3):301-316.
R. B. Miller (1990). Supervenience is a Two-Way Street. Journal of Philosophy 87 (12):695-701.
Mark Moyer (2008). Weak and Global Supervenience Are Strong. Philosophical Studies 138 (1):125 - 150.
Erhan Demircioglu (2011). Supervenience and Reductive Physicalism. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7 (1):25-35.
B. R. Tilghman (2004). Reflections on Aesthetic Judgement. British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (3):248-260.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

19 ( #147,764 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #289,822 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.